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THE IMPACT OF M&AS ON BANK RISK IN SPAIN (1986-2007)
Our article presents the short term changes in bank risk profiles before and after domestic 
banks M&As that took place before the present crisis (1986-2007) based on different ex-
ante and ex-post measures of risk. Our results control for potential selection bias and 
show that, for acquiring banks, size and capitalization are important drivers of risk changes 
before and after M&As. For target banks, we find that target banks that received financial 
support from the government in the context of M&As showed a statistically significant 
increase in risk-taking immediately before but not after a deal compared to all other banks. 
Overall, our results indicate that bank size, leverage and government support have not 
caused banks to engage in additional risk-taking via M&As. However, changes to banks’ 
funding and income mix are linked to higher risk-taking. Our results therefore emphasize 
the need for increased supervisory scrutiny of the sources of bank funding and income of 
merging banks.
Our study focuses on the bank consolidation process that has taken place in Spain since 
the late 1980´s and gathered speed at the onset of the euro. We focus on the period before 
the present financial crisis because due to its systemic character, some merging institutions 
in Spain (as in other EU countries) have received generous government support. Such 
support may distort financial ratios and precludes a better understanding of the risk 
implications of M&As under ‘normal’ circumstances. In light of that experience, our study 
aims to respond to a number of questions such as: What are the determinants of banks 
being targets or acquirers in M&As? Are the factors determining bank risk-taking different 
for banks that engage in M&As versus those that do not engage in M&As? Do risk factors 
change before and after the deal? Do pre-merger bank financials have any significant 
impact on changes in the risk profile caused by M&As? These are questions that, to the 
best of our knowledge, have not been thoroughly examined from the perspective of 
domestic banks in previous bank M&As studies. 
Our study focuses on the short term (three years or shorter) in order to insulate the impact of 
the M&As on our study variables. The study uses information from the regulatory database 
of Banco de España covering a total of 209 banks and 47 deals over a 25-year period.
The decision to engage in M&As is a choice variable that may be driven by risk 
considerations. A frequently hypothesized relationship involving M&As and bank risk-
taking is that banks may use a deal to increase their risk and to extract benefits from the 
financial safety net. Empirical support for this hypothesis has been offered by various 
studies [Penas and Unal (2004); Schmid and Walter (2009); Brewer and Jagtiani (2007); 
Carbó et al. (2012)]. However, in many cases, banks’ involvement in M&As is a choice. 
Some of the motives behind a bank’s decision to act as an acquirer may be linked to 
variables which also affect the risk implications of a deal. For instance, if banks with a large 
portfolio of bad loans and low levels of performance are more likely to engage in M&As 
(say, in an effort to diversify their loan portfolio and boost performance), it would not be 
surprising to find that M&As, by affecting loan quality and performance, also alter a bank’s 
risk profile. However, the reasons for changes in a bank’s risk profile may then be linked to 
and driven by motivations for why banks chose to engage in M&As, rather than by M&As. 
To address this selection problem, we employ a Heckman selection model which first 
estimates the probability that a bank engages in M&As (as an acquirer or as a target) and 
then documents changes in the risk profile of a bank after having corrected for potential 
1  Introduction
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selection bias. Consequently, this approach allows us to separate the effects of various 
bank-specific factors on bank risk (before and after M&As) from a bank’s decision to 
engage in M&As. 
Our results suggest that determinants of a bank being a target or an acquirer in Spain are 
similar to those found in studies on EU banks involved in M&As. Also, we show that M&As 
impact the risk profiles of both target and acquiring banks. In the first case, M&As seem to 
increase the overall risk except for the large acquirers. In the case of targets, the statistical 
significance is sparser but also points in the same direction. 
Our study contributes to the literature in various ways. We examine the changes in bank 
risk-taking following M&As in Spain based on different ex-ante and ex-post measures of 
risk. We use detailed bank-level information to analyze both acquirer and target perspectives. 
We insulate the economic impact of M&As on bank risk by controlling for a large number of 
determinants of M&As, including bank performance, institutional and environmental factors, 
including the possibility that target banks in crisis would receive government financial 
support in order to deal with potential selection and endogeneity biases. 
This article is divided in four parts in addition to this introduction. The second part presents 
the data and briefly describes the empirical approach. Section three shows the results of the 
multivariate analysis. Section four summarizes and concludes. 
Our study encompasses all banks and savings banks in Spain over the 1988-2010 period. 
Table 1 shows the total number of banks per year as well as the M&As that have taken 
place over that study period, as well as the number of bidders and targets per year. The 
period around the launching of the Euro (1998) was the most active for M&As (16 deals 
took place within two years of the inception of the Euro) in parallel with similar developments 
in other EU countries, where authorities seemed to have fostered national champions 
[Hernando et al. (2009)]. We have excluded deals after 2008, which is the year of the 
beginning of the banking crisis in Spain when many mergers came hand in hand with 
generous government financial support in the context of the systemic character of the 
crisis. Over our study period, we observe 47 domestic deals in which an acquirer bank 
takes control of a target bank.1 For our study, an exchange of control takes place when the 
target bank becomes part of the consolidated banking group of the acquirer as shown in 
the call reports filed with the Bank of Spain. In our study, the Spanish deals involve 29 
banks and 18 savings banks. The sample banks exclude subsidiaries of foreign banks. 
Financial ratios are calculated from non-consolidated quarterly call reports. We analyze 
changes in the risk profile of acquirer and target banks one year before and three years after 
the deal and compare with the rest of banks. T = 0 corresponds to the date of the completion 
of the deal as recorded by the Bank of Spain. Time windows around each deal could be 
shorter if either acquirer or target engages in other deal, which is recorded separately.2 
Our empirical goals involve the selection of a number of variables showing changes in 
bank risk as well as a set of covariates explaining those changes. The risk variables include 
the so-called z-score, the volatility of ROA and changes in non-performing loans. The 
definitions of the variables are presented in Table 2. 
2  Data and brief 
description of the 
empirical approach
2.1 SAMPLE SELECTION
1  We have not considered simultaneous mergers between more than two institutions.
2  For empirical purposes, we have also tried different time windows, in particular port-merger, with similar results. 
Hagendorff and Nieto (2011) also use this time window given the time that mergers need for completion.
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As for the z-score, it is an indicator of the distance to insolvency. It is originally based on 
the work of Roy (1952), who shows that the probability that current losses would exceed 
equity capital is less than or equal to 1/z2, so that a higher level of z implies lower upper 
bound of insolvency probability. This indicator has been widely used in recent analyses 
due to its suggestive distance-to-insolvency interpretation as it measures the number of 
standard deviations returns may drop before they exhaust bank’s capital. We acknowledge 
the limitations of the Z-score as a risk measure, which is used, as it is the case of the 
majority of banks in our sample, for non listed institutions. The problems of the Z-score are 
particularly relevant at listed institutions where asset value and profitability may show 
larger variations and can be related to unspecified market and industry-specific features. 
However, it is worth pointing out that our results do not rely on z-scores alone, but we also 
use two additional risk measures as explained below.
As for the volatility of ROA, it is computed over a four-quarter rolling window. Albeit 
imperfect – due the limited number of data points to compute the volatility measure and 
the potential incidence of seasonal effects – the measure shows some significant variation 
across banks. While profits can be subject to a number of discretionary accounting 
practices, a high profit volatility can still be interpreted as a source of instability and risk for 
the bank. The change in non-performing loans is also considered as a measure of risk, in 
particular, of ex-post credit risk. 
Year Number of banks Number of bidding banks Number of target banks Number of acquisitions
1986 167 18 18 0
1987 167 18 18 0
1988 170 17 16 3
1989 173 19 16 0
1990 164 20 16 1
1991 157 20 17 3
1992 153 20 16 3
1993 150 20 17 3
1994 145 20 15 3
1995 141 20 15 1
1996 137 20 14 2
1997 133 21 15 1
1998 127 20 15 6
1999 123 19 12 4
2000 112 19 13 6
2001 110 18 12 1
2002 108 18 10 3
2003 103 18 8 2
2004 100 18 7 2
2005 100 18 7 0
2006 99 18 7 1
2007 98 19 7 1
2008 93 19 7 1
2009 91 19 7 0
2010 79 17 7 0
Total 209 23 19 47
SAMPLE OVERVIEW TABLE 1 
SOURCE: Authors’ elaboration.
NOTE: Figures relate to quarter 4. Completion years are used for acquisitions. Average bank enters for 57 quarters, i.e. > 14 years.
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The explanatory variables include size – measured by total assets both in logs and in 
levels to check whether ‘empire building’ (indefinitely growing simply to maintain a status 
of a dominant bank) has an effect on the risk profiles of merging banks –; ROA in levels 
– to control for the impact of the current levels of profitability on profits dispersion and the 
other measures or risk –; the ratio of loans over total assets – to proxy for asset 
specialization and focus on the traditional banking business –; equity over total assets 
– as a measure of the current solvency levels to cover unexpected losses –; non-interest 
income – controlling for earnings diversification as a potential way of diversifying risk –; 
securitization – which is measured as the percentage of securitization funding over total 
liabilities and it captures the potential impact of this alternative source of financing on 
bank risk –; real estate lending over total loans – as an environmental control since real 
estate loans are an important business activity of Spanish banks –; personnel expenses 
over operating income – to control for this particular aspect of bank operating efficiency 
before and after the M&As –; and real GDP growth – as a control for the business cycle 
influence. Lastly, we also control for government financial support to financially distressed 
targets in order to facilitate the acquisition by a healthy bank acquirer. Over our study 
period, such financial support encompassed the purchase of impaired assets, asset 
protection schemes (including also collateral), capital injections (including subordinated 
debt) and loans at below market rates. 
Our empirical approach attempts to show the impact of domestic M&As on bank-risk taking 
and other related bank performance variables. The previous literature on M&As emphasizes 
the role of factors such as size and performance as motives for bank mergers. This suggests 
that if say targets and/or acquirers are especially large (and take additional risk as common 
2.2 EMPIRICAL APPROACH
De?nition N mean sd p50 p5 p95
Log(z) Z -score. Z = (ROA + [equity/total assets]) / ?ROA.
Return on assets (ROA) is computed as operating
income over total assets. The standard deviation (?)
of ROA is over a four-quarter rolling window 12,035 3.19 0.83 3.09 2.11 4.72
? ROA
Pro?t volatility. SD of ROA over a four-quarter
rolling window (%)
12,192 0.54 0.62 0.36 0.06 1.69
?? NPL Changes in non-performing loans (%) 12,094 -0.24 5.42 -0.01 -1.74 2.06
Size Log (1 + total assets) 12,871 13.88 2.31 14.01 9.80 17.23
Assets Total assets (euro 000 000s) 12,871 8,127.29 29,100.00 1,216.32 18.03 30,500.00
ROA ROA. Operating income over total assets (%) 12,798 4.31 2.47 4.11 0.96 7.58
Loans Loans over total assets (%) 12,871 46.94 25.67 48.91 0.06 85.13
Equity Equity over total assets (%) 12,871 14.03 21.55 6.94 2.75 81.82
Non-interest 
income





12,343 6.89 11.46 3.73 0.00 26.20
Securitization
Financing from asset securitization over
total liabilities (%)
12,871 0.70 2.54 0.00 0.00 5.02
Real estate Real estate lending over total loans (%) 12,343 41.11 26.61 41.05 0.09 86.76
Non-deposit 
funding
1 – (deposits / total liabilities) (%) 12,761 34.89 29.36 23.17 5.55 100.00
Personnel 
expenses
Personnel expenses over operating
income (%) 12,760 33.25 15.65 35.39 0.35 52.85
Support Indicates that a target bank is distressed and
received government ?nancial support 12,871 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00
GDP Real GDP growth (%) 12,476 0.68 0.61 0.80 -0.80 1.50
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS AND SUMMARY STATISTICS TABLE 2 
SOURCE: Authors’ elaboration. 
 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 55 ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA, NÚM. 25
for large banks), changes bank risk-taking following a deal may be driven by factors that 
are related to the motives for why banks engaging in M&As rather than by the characteristics 
of a deal. This suggests we need to model a bank’s propensity to engage in M&As in order 
to correct for potential selection bias when merging bank and non-merging banks differ in 
important aspects which could affect merger outcomes. Put differently, we need to isolate 
the influence of size and other factors related to the decision to participate in M&As for 
both targets and acquirers from the effects of a deal on risk-taking.
The standard way of addressing this selection bias is Heckman’s procedure (1976 and 
1978). This procedure introduces into the models a variable Heckman called ‘Lambda.’ 
This variable is also known as Mill’s inverse odds ratio (‘Mills ratio’). It measures the 
covariance between the error terms of the single-equation regression for an endogenous 
variable with the residuals from the selection equation. 
The implementation of the Heckman selection bias-correction procedure is commonly 
applied to cross-sectional studies, but is less frequently used in panel data estimations. In 
our case, the setting for the model will be as follows:
y*it = xit ii+ eit     [1]
d*it = zit + i + i + vit      [2]
dit = 1 if d
*
it > 0       [3]
yit = y
*
it * dit        [4]
where y*it is a latent endogenous variable with observed counterpart yit which shows the 
risk-taking behavior of bank i at time t; d*it is a latent variable (merging vs. not merging; or 
acquirer vs. target) with the associated indicator function dit, reflecting whether the primary 
dependent variable is observed and where the relationships, between d*it, and dit and yit, 
and y*it respectively, are shown in [3] and [4]. Equation [1] is of primary interest and [2] is the 
reduced form for the latent variable capturing sample selection; xit, and zit, are vectors of 
exogenous variables;  and  are vectors of unknown parameters
The dependent variable in the primary equation is only observed for the observations 
satisfying the selection rule (namely, d*it > 0). To introduce selection bias, assume the errors 
for each equation can be decomposed into an individual effect (i, and i), a time effect (i, 
and i), and an idiosyncratic effect (eit and vit e), where each of the error components is 
assumed to be normally distributed and correlated with the component of the same 
dimension in other equation. As the treatment of the time effects as random increases the 
difficulty of estimation, in terms of computational requirements, it is simpler to treat them 
as fixed time effects and absorbed in, xit and zit.
Given the distributional assumptions, it is possible to estimate the parameters by maximum 
likelihood (see Annex). This is adopted, inter alia, in Hausman and Wise (1979), Keane, 
Moffitt and Runkle (1988) or Nijman and Verbeek (1992). 
In our empirical setting, the probit equation is given by [2], where d*it is a latent variable 
identifying merging vs. non-merging banks or acquiring vs. target banks. Equation [1] is 
then estimated by maximum likelihood including the lambda correction for estimation bias. 
yit is the bank-risk of bank performance variable. As for the probit selection equation, the 
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set of explanatory variables (zit) include size, performance (as measured by return on 
assets; ROA) and cost inefficiency. Previous evidence has demonstrated that larger, more 
profitable and more cost efficient banks tend to engage in acquisition as acquirers, while 
the opposite is true for acquisition targets [see Hernando et al. (2009), for an overview of 
the determinants of bank acquisitions in European banking]. We also control for the 
importance of traditional banking activities (via the ratio of loans to total assets and the 
ratio of non-interest income to operating income), bank funding other than deposits, bank 
leverage and the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans. Finally, business cycles 
which we control for (via real GDP growth) may equally affect M&As activity as the quality 
of bank assets improves in periods of economic growth. 
Given the bank-level aggregation of some variables, the standard errors are clustered at 
the bank-level.
In order to indentify the affects of M&As on bank risk profiles, we need to separate the 
effects of various bank-specific factors on bank risk (before and after M&As) from a bank’s 
decision to engage in M&As. From here onwards we show a summary of the main empirical 
results of a working paper.3 To do so, we start by estimating the probability that a bank 
engages in M&As (as an acquirer or as a target) using a probit selection procedure as 
described in equations [1] to [4]. The tables for this selection equation are not shown for 
exposition simplicity.
We find that size is to be an important identifying characteristic of acquiring banks. The 
other identifying factor is solvency (the ratio of equity to total assets is positively and 
significantly related to the probability of being an acquiring bank and negatively related to 
being a target bank). It is also worth noting that higher levels of inefficiency are also 
significantly associated with the probability of being a target bank in M&As. Lastly, the 
level of wholesale (non-deposit) financing is significantly associated with the probability of 
being a target in a Spanish M&As.
Table 3 summarizes the main results for acquirer banks. All control variables in this and the 
following tables are lagged by one quarter. The results for the equation in which the log of 
the z-score is the dependent variable suggest that even though size is not found to be a 
significant driver of financial stability for acquiring banks, M&As have a marginal effect on 
this relationship after the merger. In particular, size is positively related to the bank´s 
financial stability after a deal. This finding suggests that even if mergers may be potentially 
sought for ‘empire building’ purposes, M&As do reduce the overall risk profile for large 
acquirer banks. This is an important result, because it is not consistent with the notion that 
large banks engage in additional risk-taking through M&As, possibly by engineering risk-
increasing deals to exploit the subsidies of the financial safety net. One explanation for this 
result is that supervisors are aware of large banks’ systemic character and prod them to 
reduce their risk profile following a deal. If that is the case, Spanish bank supervisors have 
been effective in curbing additional risk-taking by large banks around M&As.  
For banks that engage in M&As, there is no evidence that the effect of ROA on risk-taking 
is different either before and after the merger compare with all other Spanish banks. 
We also find a negative and statistically significant impact of the solvency ratio defined as 
equity to total assets on the z-score (implying more risk-taking) after the M&As, as shown 
3  Analysis of the results 
of our multivariate 
analysis
3.1  PROBABILITY OF A BANK 
BEING AN ACQUIRER/
TARGET
3.2  IMPACT OF M&AS IN THE 
RISK PROFILE OF BANKS
3.2.1  Impact on acquirer banks 
vs. other banks
3  The paper can be downloaded from http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=2318142.
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by the interaction term. If only better capitalized banks engage in additional risk-taking 
post-M&As, this is suggestive of regulatory scrutiny preventing additional risk-taking by 
lesser-capitalized banks after M&As. Less capitalized banks face incentives to shift risk 
onto the financial safety net and risk-increasing acquisitions may be one way of achieving 
this. However, our results show that only higher capitalized banks engaged in additional 
risk taking post-M&As, which seems consistent with a more efficient use of capital. 
The results also provide some evidence of a negative and statistically significant post-
merger effect on the acquiring bank’s stability of non-interest income, and the reliance of 
nontraditional sources of financing such as asset securitization. This may imply that 
income diversification via fees and commissions as well as reliance on funding from 
securitizations involve higher risk-taking for acquirer banks after the deal. Consistent with 
this finding is that the acquiring banks with large real estate lending portfolios, a more 
traditional business, show statistically significant lower risk profile before the merger, 
although this variable losses statistical significance after the merger possibly showing 
portfolio restructuring after the deal. Also, we find that personnel expenses significantly 
reduce the acquiring bank distance to insolvency (more risk) after the M&As, as the 
acquirer banks usually have to face significant restructuring costs. 
The regression results where the bank risk measure is the standard deviation of ROA are 
fully consistent with those of the z-score described above. The same results on the impact 
of size and equity are found in both specifications (with an opposite sign given that higher 
value of ROA shows more risk) but no statistically significant relationship was found for 
securitization, non-interest income and personnel expenses.
Acquirer overall risk variables
Interact: 1 year before Interact: 3 years after Interact: 1 year before Interact: 3 years after 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ROA -- - --- ++ ++ +++
Equity ++ ++ +
Non-interest income +
Securitization + ++ ++ - - --
Real estate - -- -- -
Inter x  Size ++ --
Inter x  Equity --- ++
Inter x  Non-interest income + ---
Inter x  Real estate ++
Constant ++ ++ ++





Dependent variable: lg(z) Dependent variable: ?ROA
Dependent variable: ?Non-performing loans
SUMMARY RESULTS FOR ACQUIRER BANKS TABLE 3 
SOURCE: Authors’ elaboration.
NOTE: Only the variables which are found to be statistically signi?cant in at least one of the equations are shown with "+" meaning a positive relationship, "-" meaning 
a negative relationship. One sign denotes signi?cance at 10%, two signs denotes signi?cance at 5% and three signs denotes signi?cance at 1%.  
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The results when the (risk) dependent variable is the change in non-performing loans 
(NPLs) for acquirer banks. We use this dependent variable as a proxy for ex-post risk 
effects. Only efficiency, measured in terms of personnel expenses, seems to have a 
statistically significant impact on the change in NPLs of acquirer banks after the merger, 
suggesting that most inefficient acquirer banks have also less quality loan portfolios and 
become more risky after the M&As.
The results for target banks are summarized in Table 4. Overall, non traditional sources of 
funding and income of target banks are linked to additional risk-taking in the three years 
following a M&A. Thus, the results seem to indicate that target banks are characterized for 
showing a negative and statistically significant impact of their profitability (ROA), exposure 
to real estate (as shown by the real estate lending over total assets) and reliance on non-
deposit funding on the distance to default in non M&As period. For target banks that 
heavily rely on wholesale funding, the regression results suggest an increase in the distance 
to default or reduction of the risk before the merger and an increase of their risk profile (as 
measured by the Z-Score) in the three years after the M&As. In turn, target banks that 
heavily rely on the non-traditional source of income (as opposed to interest income) seem 
to reduce their risk profile in the three-year period after the deal. Solvency, profitability and 
focus on real estate lending do not seem to have a statistically significant impact on 
merging banks´ either before or after the deal. 
The variable support identifies target banks that have received government support for the 
M&As in the context of a bank restructuring process that involved an acquisition by other 
bank. The interactions show that target banks have taken on additional risk measured by 
log Z score or ROA before they received government support, but, interestingly, supported 
banks have not engaged in additional risk taking relative to other non merging banks in the 
same time period following the M&As. The result that targets which received government 
support are not significantly prone to additional risk taking is interesting, because it shows 
that Spanish banks that benefitted from government financial support have not exploited 
the safety net through higher risk taking after completion of a M&As, probably because 
supervisors did not allow that to happen.
The results when the (risk) dependent variable is the change in non-performing loans (NPLs) 
for target banks show that largest target banks experience increases of risk measured by 
∆NPLs premerger but size has no impact on this risk metric after the deal. The results also 
suggest that the solvency ratio of target banks seems to significantly reduce the targets´ 
post-merger risk profile measured by ∆NPLs, which seems consistent with the restructuring 
of the NPL portfolio after the deal. Before the merger, the impact is positive and statistically 
significant indicating an increase in targets´ risk during the year previous to the merger. The 
weight of real estate loans in the asset portfolio and personnel expenses over operating 
income seem to be a distinctive risk-generating feature of target banks as shown by the 
∆NPLs before the deal. However, their impact is not statistically significant after the M&As. 
As with the Z-Score and ROA regressions, the interaction between ∆NPLs and the support 
indicator confirms that target banks that were in crisis and received financial support from 
the government have highly statistically significant ∆NPLs before M&As but the interaction 
of support is not statistically significant after M&As. That is, targets in financial distress 
increase their risk profile proxy by ∆NPLs before the M&As but not after. Again, this is not 
consistent with the moral hazard hypothesis according to which Spanish banks that 
received government support have exploited the financial safety net post M&As relative to 
target banks which have not received financial support of government.
3.2.2  Impact on target banks 
vs. other banks
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Our study shows how domestic M&As affect the risk-taking profile of Spanish banks in the 
years immediately before and after the deal. Our most relevant findings are as follows: Size 
and solvency are found to be positively and significantly related to the probability of being 
an acquiring bank and negatively to the probability of being a target bank in Spain. While 
higher levels of inefficiency are also significantly associated with the probability of being a 
target bank. This empirical evidence is in line with that for the average European bank 
engaged in a domestic M&As. Lastly, the level of wholesale funding (proxied by non deposit 
financing) is significantly associated with the probability of being a target bank in Spain. 
For acquiring banks, the short term key drivers of risk changes before and after the deal 
are size and capitalization (measured in terms of capital over total assets). The regression 
results of two of our selection variables indicating changes in banks’ ex-ante risk profile 
(log Z-Score and ROA) show that size is the only of our selected explanatory variables 
that it is positively related to the reduction of acquiring banks´ risk profile after the M&As. 
This outcome seems to explain supervisors´ objective of building national champions to 
reduce banks´ risk profile.
In turn, highly capitalized acquirers increase their risk profile after the deal in what it seems 
an attempt to a more efficient use of capital.
4 Conclusions
Target overall risk variables
Interact: 1 year before Interact: 3 years after Interact: 1 year before Interact: 3 years after 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Size ---
ROA --- -- -
Equity ++ + ++
Real estate -- -- --
Non-deposit funding --- --- ---
Support - - +++
Inter x  Non-interest income - ++
Inter x  Non-deposit funding +++ ---
Inter x  Support --- -
Target loan risk variables
(1) (2) (3)
Size -- -- -
GDP +++ +++ +++
Real estate + + +
Support -
Inter x  Size ++
Inter x  Equity ++ ---
Inter x  Real estate ---
Inter x Personnel expenses --
Inter x  Support +++
Constant ++ ++ +
Dependent variable: lg(z) Dependent variable: ?ROA
Dependent variable: ?Non-performing loans
SUMMARY RESULTS FOR TARGETS BANKS TABLE 4
SOURCE: Authors’ elaboration.
NOTE: Only the variables which are found to be statistically signi?cant in at least one of the equations are shown with "+" meaning a positive relationship, "-" meaning 
a negative relationship. One sign denotes signi?cance at 10%, two signs denotes signi?cance at 5% and three signs denotes signi?cance at 1%.  
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Regarding target banks, the regression results of all our selection variables indicate 
changes in banks’ ex-ante and ex-post risk show that target banks in financial distress that 
received financial support from the government in the context of the M&As did not increase 
their risk profile in the period immediately after the deal as compared to all other banks. 
Our results suggests that Spanish supervisors prevented large and poorly capitalized 
bank acquirers from taking additional risk via M&As. Equally, Spanish supervisors 
prevented targets which received government financial support from taking additional 
risk during time period following M&As. In many ways our results are reassuring, because 
they appear to indicate that supervisors have remained vigilant and effective in terms of 
reigning in risk taking in the context of M&As related to bank size, leverage and 
government support. However, our results also show that supervisors were less effective 
in preventing risk taking of banks that rely on non-traditional funding and income. 
Acquirers which rely on non-interest income and non-deposit funding take more risk 
post-M&As. Similarly, target banks that rely on wholesale funding are associated with 
more risk-taking post-M&As. 
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The marginal likelihood of an individual is given by:
          [5]
where   
is the set of time indices for the periods in which individual i is observed and denotes 
deviations from the observed individual means:
          [6]
where Ti denotes the number of elements in Ti; y
~
it denotes the Ti-vector of observed y
~
it’s. 
By maximizing the maximum likelihood function (the product of all l mit ) we will obtain 
consistent and asymptotically normally distributed estimators for  and .
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